Polish Constitutional Tribunal goes down with dignity by Koncewicz, Tomasz Tadeusz
Do 25 Aug
2016
Polish Constitutional Tribunal goes down with dignity
 verfassungsblog.de /polish-constitutional-tribunal-goes-down-with-dignity/
Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz Do 25 Aug 2016
The Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s last stand ?
On 11 of August 2016 the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (“Tribunal”) decided case K 39/16 in which it disqualified,
for the second time in the span of 5 months, court-packing provisions contained in the Law of 22 July, 2016 on
the Constitutional Tribunal. Separation of powers, judicial independence and effective functioning of the
constitutional court were again the keywords that informed the analysis. In K 39/16 the Tribunal built on its
previous unpublished (case K 47/15) and unimplemented (K 34/15 and K 35/15) judgments in which it had
already dealt with the court-packing. This case law reminds Martin Shapiro’s argument about the consequences
of the choice made by the constitution makers to resort to a court as a conflict resolver. Such choice entails the
acceptance of „the inherent characteristics, practices, strengths and weaknesses of that institution … and some
law making by courts and a certain capacity for judicial self-defense of its law making activity. The issue of
whether such law making and self-defense are somehow antidemocratic or antimajoritarian is uninteresting. If
the demos chooses the institution, it chooses the judicial law making and judicial self-defense“[1]. After this most
recent case, though, the clock is ticking on the Tribunal and this time the self-defense by way of courageous
judicial pronouncements might not be enough to survive.
The order emphasized that most of the provisions in the new Law replicate these already found to be
unconstitutional in the judgment of 9 of March 2016 (case K 47/15). Therefore, in view of the repetetive nature of
most of the claims, the Tribunal felt strong enough to decide the case by way of a reasoned order, rather than a
judgment. The Tribunal reiterated that its rulings must be published immediately in the shortest possible time
given the circumstances of each case. Government authorities have no discretion but to publish all rulings of the
Tribunal as required by the clear language of art. 190 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Tribunal criticized in the
strongest possible words practice of singling out its rulings that will be published in the Journal of Laws, and
these that will not be, and the government’s refusal to publish the judgments made by the Tribunal in the exercise
of its constitutional powers. The Tribunal clearly saw through the intentions of the Sejm. The Sejm performed a
review of individual rulings and concluded that judges behind these rulings acted ultra vires. Therefore, the
refusal to publish these “negatively reviewed” rulings would be held to be justified and, as a result, make the
future publication of the Tribunals’ rulings dependent on the consent of the legislative branch. For the Tribunal this
is inadmissible encroachment by the executive on the competences of a constitutional court and aims at the
stigmatization of the judges who decided these cases. Such practice runs afoul of the standards of the state
governed by the rule of law (Rechtstaat) and is alien to the legal culture to which Republic of Poland belongs.
The Tribunal was clear: all rulings are unconditionally binding and must be published.
As for the vexing problem of the Tribunal’s composition, the order simply refers to the constitutional interpretation
already made in December 2015 judgments, and calls on the state authorities to bring to an end the situation of
disrespect of the Tribunal’s rulings. The Tribunal reminded the straightforward: legislator must not elect new
judges when there is no vacancy as such was the case here. Forcing thus the President of the Tribunal to allow
three judges elected by PiS to start adjudication, would be unconstitutional and “incompatible with the judgments
of the Court which are binding on all state authorities, the Tribunal and its President included”.
Besides art. 89 and 90 of the Law (see analysis above), the Tribunal declared unconstitutional art. 26 para 1 point
g of the Law (possibility for the three judges to request the case be heard by the full court); art. 38 paras 3 – 6
(the principle whereby cases are ruled on in the order in which applications were lodged at the Registry); art. 68
paras 5-7 (procedure allowing at least 4 judges of the Tribunal to raise during the deliberation an objection(s)
related to a proposed judgment, every time important “institutional issues or issues on the public order are at
stake”; art. 80 para 4 (publication of the Tribunal’s rulings dependent on the motion being lodged by the President
of the Tribunal with the Prime Minister) and, last but not least, all temporal provisions (art. 83 para 2 and art. 84 –
87). The latter gave the Tribunal no chance of adjusting to the provisions of the new Law. They would require the
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Tribunal to rule on the cases pending prior to the entry into force of the Law within one year from the date of entry
into force of the Law. The Tribunal stressed that such requirement would put it into an impossible situation as the
cases lodged at the Tribunal after the entry into force of the Law would have to wait and the Tribunal would have
to shift its attention to all the cases already pending before the entry into force of the Law. For the Tribunal,
setting down time limits for disposing of cases constitutes an inadmissible interference with the judicial branch
and violates the principle of separation of powers.
“Constitutional-catch-me-if-you-can”
To believe, though, that this ruling will change anything would be to underestimate the resolve and determination
of the ruling party in its quest to annihilate the Court. It even looks that in the aftermath of this ruling, the majority
will harden its position even more. The leader of the ruling party, Jarosław Kaczynski, has not only ruled out the
publication of this decision, but he also promised to go back to the old and more radical version of the court-
packing plan that had been already declared unconstitutional in March 2016. It looks like we are back to drawing
board. This time though, the President of PiS, Kaczynski, added novel dimension to the practice of refusal to
publish the Tribunal’s judgments. He declared, even before the judgment was pronounced (!), that whatever the
Tribunal decides on 11 of August 2016, it will not be published. After the order in case K 39/16, the “constitutional
catch-me-if-you-can” starts all over again, with no end in sight. Vicious circle results as, in the aftermath of this
most recent ruling by the Tribunal, PiS was quick to come up with assurances that new Law on the Tribunal will
be now drafted expeditiously and, by all means, this time, fully compliant with the Constitution[2]. Constitutional
games to continue then.
Constitutional narrative(s) in flux
The persistent refusal by the executive to publish the judgments of the constitutional court is indeed mind –
boggling and unheard of in Europe. It was never entertained by the Polish founding fathers, either. When the
Constitution of 1997 has been drafted, it was thought that the authority of a judicial pronouncement and the
respect for the Constitution will carry enough clout to secure the universal observance of the judgments issued by
the Tribunal and that the rule of law is rooted in the public consciousness to the point where no politicians would
ever dare to undermine the judicial review. However, the new Law on the Tribunal of 22 July 2016 entrenched the
“constitutional-unconstitutional” duality of the Polish legal system under PiS. What has been conventionally
accepted as “constitutional” for years, has now taken on new understanding of constitutionality in accordance
with the narrative of the ruling party. Traditional constitutionality and rule of law as understood post-1989 give
way to the flouting of the constitutional document and imposing new understanding on the constitutional
institutions and concepts that seemed to be rooted in Polish constitutionalism. The Tribunal and constitutional
review fell first victim of this reversal in constitutional narrative.
Moving forward and waiting for constitutional vindication  
H. Schwartz has argued that the rise of the independent constitutional courts in Eastern Europe was remarkable
and that these courts were ready to challenge and overturn important statutes, bills and regulations. He
concludes “and most (of these courts – T.T.K.) seem to have gotten away with it”[3]. For the very first time since
its birth back in 1986 the very survival of the Tribunal has been on the line. Today the time has finally come to
admit that the Polish Constitutional Tribunal did not manage “to get away with it this time”. Its self-defense was
not enough, and the constellation of lucky events that allowed it to survive in the past, came to an end[4]. The
Tribunal we used to know is gone, but at least it never faltered and backed down when trying to stave off the
constitutional assault[5]. The precious jurisprudence it has managed to build over the last year in response to the
attack on its independence and the rule of law, is something we must be looking up to and fall back on. This case
law read together is as a reflection of the best constitutional traditions Poland has to offer. That is a lot moving
forward, while waiting for better constitutional times. Make no mistake, they will eventually come, and with them,
full vindication of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal.
[1] M. Shapiro, The European Court of Justice. Of Institutions and Democracy,  32 Israel Law Review (1998) 1.  
[2] The budget of the Tribunal has been already severely undercut to the point that this years conference to
commemorate the 30th Anniversary of the Tribunal has been canceled. The follow-up to this is the most recent
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proposal that aims at divesting former and future judges of the retirement benefits, all under the pretense of
making the Tribunal “less byzantine” (sic!).
[3] H. Schwartz, The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe , (University of Chicago
Press, 2000), at p. XI.
[4] See brilliant historical account by L. Garlicki, Constitutional Court of Poland , in P. Pasquino, F. Billi, (eds.), The
Political origins of Constitutional Courts. Italy, Germany, France, Poland, Canada, United Kingdom, (Fondazione
Adriano Olivetti, 2009).
[5] Bear in mind, though, that in all the cases in which the Tribunal defended the Constitution, three PiS-
nominated judges dissented and sided uncritically with the parliamentary majority. They clearly see their role on
the bench as an extension of the nominating party. In the process Constitution becomes an after-thought.
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